Constrained efficiency versus unanimity in incomplete markets

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0968-1zbMath1405.91290OpenAlexW2335348071MaRDI QIDQ2363421

Michael Zierhut

Publication date: 19 July 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0968-1

zbMATH Keywords

constrained efficiencyincomplete markets with productionshareholder unanimityfirm objectivesmajority stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Financial intermediation and the welfare theorems in incomplete markets, Investment and financing in incomplete markets, Nonexistence of constrained efficient production plans, Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets

Cites Work

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