Price leadership in a duopoly with capacity constraints and product differentiation

DOI10.1007/BF01237435zbMath0774.90012MaRDI QIDQ2366127

Dan Kovenock, Dave Furth

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

product differentiationduopoly modelStackelberg gamesubgame-perfect equilibriacapacity constrained firms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Endogenous price leadership ⋮ Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note ⋮ Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information ⋮ Price leadership in a homogeneous product market ⋮ Two is not too many for monopoly

Cites Work

• Privatization, price regulation, and market entry. An asymmetric multistage duopoly model
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Approximate Bertrand Equilibria in a Replicated Industry
• Price Leadership
• Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points

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