Endogenous firm efficiency in a Cournot principal-agent model
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Publication:2366844
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1028zbMath0771.90023OpenAlexW1998757506MaRDI QIDQ2366844
Publication date: 19 August 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/383
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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