The paradox of multiple elections
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2386269
DOI10.1007/s003550050101zbMath1066.91516OpenAlexW2010224528MaRDI QIDQ2386269
William S. Zwicker, D. Marc Kilgour, Steven J. Brams
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050101
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