When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
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Publication:2386287
DOI10.1007/s003550050118zbMath1066.91528MaRDI QIDQ2386287
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050118
91B14: Social choice
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