Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
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Publication:2388738
DOI10.1007/PL00007177zbMath1069.91548WikidataQ56212392 ScholiaQ56212392MaRDI QIDQ2388738
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B14: Social choice
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