Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
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Publication:2388743
DOI10.1007/s003550050011zbMath1069.91529MaRDI QIDQ2388743
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050011
91B12: Voting theory
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