Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
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Publication:2388757
DOI10.1007/s003550050025zbMath1069.91563OpenAlexW2093106856MaRDI QIDQ2388757
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050025
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