Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
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Publication:2388775
DOI10.1007/s003550000049zbMath1069.91526MaRDI QIDQ2388775
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000049
91B12: Voting theory
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