On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation
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Publication:2388803
DOI10.1007/s003550100106zbMath1069.91512WikidataQ59972833 ScholiaQ59972833MaRDI QIDQ2388803
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100106
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
00A69: General applied mathematics
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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