An efficient multi-receipt mechanism for uncoercible anonymous electronic voting

DOI10.1016/J.MCM.2008.05.039zbMATH Open1187.94033OpenAlexW1999881123MaRDI QIDQ2389795FDOQ2389795

Authors: Chun-I Fan, Wei-Zhe Sun 

Publication date: 18 July 2009

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.039

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zbMATH Keywords

cryptographyblind signaturessecurity and privacyanonymous electronic votinguncoercibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Cites Work

• A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
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• Security arguments for digital signatures and blind signatures
• Security proofs for signature schemes
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• The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
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• Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
• Efficent receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
• A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections
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• Improved low-computation partially blind signatures.
• The computer ate my vote

Cited In (5)

• Anonymity in voting revisited
• Financial Cryptography
• A coercion-resistant blockchain-based E-voting protocol with receipts
• Receipt-Free K-out-of-L Voting Based on ElGamal Encryption
• Provably secure randomized blind signature scheme based on bilinear pairing

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