The preferences of homo moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity

DOI10.1007/S00182-016-0548-4MaRDI QIDQ2398199zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan Newton

Publication date 15 August 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://econ-wpseries.com/2014/201414-02.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

assortative matchingevolutionmoral values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Homo moralis -- preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• The logic of animal conflict
• Uniform asymptotics of the Pollaczek polynomials via the Riemann–Hilbert approach

Cited in

(15)

• Evolutionary games and matching rules
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Contribution-based grouping under noise
• The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types
• Entitlement to assort: democracy, compromise culture and economic stability
• Matching markets and cultural selection
• Labelling, homophily and preference evolution
• Stable sampling in repeated games
• Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture
• Homo moralis -- preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
• Rational beliefs when the truth is not an option
• The evolutionary stability of moral foundations
• Positive and negative selective assortment
• Many-strategy games in groups with relatives and the evolution of coordinated cooperation
• Pairwise imitation and tournament graphs

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