A financial alliance compromise between executives and supervisory authorities
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2005.06.033zbMATH Open1142.91403OpenAlexW1991698451MaRDI QIDQ2433486FDOQ2433486
Authors: Pekka J. Korhonen, Lasse Koskinen, Raimo Voutilainen
Publication date: 27 October 2006
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.06.033
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- Finding the most preferred alliance structure between banks and insurance companies
- The Integration Of Financial Services in Europe
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- Remarks on “Financial Services Integration: Right for some, Wrong for Others?”
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