Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: a theoretical approach

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.03.036MaRDI QIDQ2440138zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Cracau, Benjamin Franz

Publication date 27 March 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036

zbMATH Keywords

corruptionmonetary incentivesprincipal-agent game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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