On the strictly descending multi-unit auction

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.10.009MaRDI QIDQ2441241zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vitali Gretschko, Alexander Rasch, Achim Wambach

Publication date 24 March 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.009

zbMATH Keywords

discriminatory descending auctionDutch auctionfirst-price sealed-bid auctionmulti-unit auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Descending price multi-item auctions
• The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions
• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
• Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3109695 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal Auction Design
• The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions
• The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout option
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.

Cited in

(7)

• On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time
• Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation
• Information acquisition during a descending auction
• Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions
• Descending price multi-item auctions
• The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions

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