The relational underpinnings of formal contracting and the welfare consequences of legal system improvement

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.01.025MaRDI QIDQ2444451zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Benjamin Hermalin, Larry K. B. Li, Tony Naughton

Publication date 9 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.025

zbMATH Keywords

relational contractingformal and informal contractinglegal system improvement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cited in

(3)

• Relationships and growth: on the dynamic interplay between relational contracts and competitive markets in economic development
• Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy
• Legal environment and contractual choice

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