Pay-to-bid auctions: to bid or not to bid

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2013.05.010MaRDI QIDQ2450690zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. Kakhbod

Publication date 15 May 2014

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

pay-to-bid auctionsrevenue managementrisk neutral biddersrisk-loving bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Learning when to Auction and when to Bid
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3939034
• Revenue-maximizing auctions: a bidder's standpoint
• Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions
• Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
• The expected payoff to Internet auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1690083
• All-pay auctions with pre- and post-bidding options
• Banning bidders from all-pay auctions
• Multi-unit pay-your-bid auctions with variable awards

Cites work

• Game theory
• Microeconomic theory
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information

Cited in

(11)

• More on phantom bidding
• Reverse contests
• Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions
• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• Banning bidders from all-pay auctions
• Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction
• Research on pricing rules and expected revenue under all-pay auctions
• All-pay auctions with pre- and post-bidding options
• Information architecture and its impact on the equilibrium for all-pay auction models
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Surplus dissipating equilibria in the dollar auction

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