Environmental regulation of technically inefficient firms
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.08.010zbMATH Open1288.91159OpenAlexW2012935040MaRDI QIDQ2451391FDOQ2451391
Authors: Bruno Wichmann 
Publication date: 3 June 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.010
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Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
Cited In (9)
- Technological externalities and environmental policy
- Plant vintage, technology, and environmental regulation.
- Regulating Untaxable Externalities: Are Vehicle Air Pollution Standards Effective and Efficient?
- The impact of firm-firm externalities on environmental standard
- Regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at publicly-owned treatment plants
- Can Direct Regulations Spur Innovations in Environmental Technologies? A Study on Firm‐Level Patenting
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information
- Direct regulation of a mobile polluting firm.
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