A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.08.033MaRDI QIDQ2451422zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Swaprava Nath, Onno R. Zoeter

Publication date 3 June 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.033

zbMATH Keywords

efficient mechanismsex-post incentive compatibilityex-post individual rationalityinterdependent value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Microeconomic theory
• The Limits of ex post Implementation

Cited in

(10)

• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
• Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
• A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Efficient bilateral trade with interdependent values: the use of two-stage mechanisms
• Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction

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