On the efficiency of influence-and-exploit strategies for revenue maximization under positive externalities

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2014.04.026zbMath1358.91053arXiv1110.1894OpenAlexW1979392778WikidataQ59818369 ScholiaQ59818369MaRDI QIDQ2453122

Paris Siminelakis, Dimitris Fotakis

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.1894

zbMATH Keywords

pricingexternalitiesinfluence and exploit strategiessocial network monetization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (2)

Welfare maximization with friends-of-friends network externalities ⋮ Inequity aversion pricing over social networks: approximation algorithms and hardness results

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Maximizing Non-monotone Submodular Functions
• Improved approximation algorithms for maximum cut and satisfiability problems using semidefinite programming
• Interior Point Methods in Semidefinite Programming with Applications to Combinatorial Optimization
• Contagion

This page was built for publication: On the efficiency of influence-and-exploit strategies for revenue maximization under positive externalities