Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2457235
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.003zbMath1162.91354WikidataQ56658252 ScholiaQ56658252MaRDI QIDQ2457235
Jinwoo Kim, Yeon-Koo Che, James Andreoni
Publication date: 30 October 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://econ.ucsd.edu/~jandreon/WorkingPapers/AuctionACK.pdf
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
91A90: Experimental studies
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Cites Work
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