Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2457245
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001zbMath1271.91077MaRDI QIDQ2457245
Zhixiang Zhang, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Yeneng Sun, Haifeng Fu
Publication date: 30 October 2007
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001
Related Items
On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization, Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence, On the diffuseness of incomplete information game, Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs, Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information, On games with incomplete information and the Dvoretsky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem with countable partitions, Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information, Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games, A general Fatou lemma, On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games with private information: a complete characterization
Cites Work
- Distributional properties of correspondences on Loeb spaces
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide
- Pure strategies in games with private information
- The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games
- Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
- Elimination of Randomization in Certain Statistical Decision Procedures and Zero-Sum Two-Person Games
