Strategies of voting in stochastic environment: egoism and collectivism

DOI10.1134/S0005117906020093MaRDI QIDQ2457511zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors V. I. Borzenko, Z. M. Lezina, A. K. Loginov, Ya. Yu. Tsodikova, Pavel Chebotarev

Publication date 23 October 2007

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.4460

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

Abstract: Consideration was given to a model of social dynamics controlled by successive collective decisions based on the threshold majority procedures. The current system state is characterized by the vector of participants' capitals (utilities). At each step, the voters can either retain their status quo or accept the proposal which is a vector of the algebraic increments in the capitals of the participants. In this version of the model, the vector is generated stochastically. Comparative utility of two social attitudes--egoism and collectivism--was analyzed. It was established that, except for some special cases, the collectivists have advantages, which makes realizable the following scenario: on the conditions of protecting the corporate interests, a group is created which is joined then by the egoists attracted by its achievements. At that, group egoism approaches altruism. Additionally, one of the considered variants of collectivism handicaps manipulation of voting by the organizers.

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Cites work

• Dynamic aspects of voting theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3473134 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(7)

• Comparative efficiency of altruism and egoism as voting strategies in stochastic environment
• The optimal majority threshold as a function of the variation coefficient of the environment
• On optimal group claims at voting in a stochastic environment
• Analytical expression of the expected values of capital at voting in the stochastic environment
• Analysis of collectivism and egoism phenomena within the context of social welfare
• Voting in a stochastic environment: the case of two groups
• Voting originated social dynamics: quartile analysis of stochastic environment peculiarities

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