On the determinants of optimal border enforcement

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0166-7MaRDI QIDQ2464009zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mark G. Guzman, Joseph H. Haslag, Pia M. Orrenius

Publication date 10 December 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0166-7

zbMATH Keywords

border enforcementeconomic growthillegal immigrationsmuggling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economic dynamics (91B55) Economic growth models (91B62) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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• A competitive model of economic geography

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