An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
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Publication:2465991
DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2007.02.004zbMath1130.91391MaRDI QIDQ2465991
Alistair Ulph, Santiago J. Rubio
Publication date: 11 January 2008
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/33203/1/0210.pdf
self-enforcing international environmental agreements; stock pollutant; internal and external stability conditions
91F10: History, political science
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
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