Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior
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Publication:2481225
DOI10.1007/s10683-006-9156-7zbMath1133.91300MaRDI QIDQ2481225
James C. Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj, Klarita Sadiraj
Publication date: 9 April 2008
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2006-10.pdf
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