Non-compliance and the quota price in an ITQ fishery

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2004.06.002zbMATH Open1090.91581OpenAlexW2059369410MaRDI QIDQ2485564FDOQ2485564

Authors: Aaron Hatcher 

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2004.06.002

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zbMATH Keywords

EnforcementFisheries managementPollution permitsQuotasITQsNon-compliance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (8)

• Minimum information management systems and ITQ fisheries management.
• The effects on welfare of the imposition of individual transferable quotas on a heterogeneous fishing fleet.
• Associative algebra twisted bundles over compact topological spaces
• Fishing quota markets
• On module bundles and topological \(K\)-theory
• Unipotent factorization of vector bundle automorphisms
• A note on \(n\)-gerbes and transgressions
• On avoidance activities in fishery enforcement models

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