Dynamic price competition

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.002zbMath1125.91020MaRDI QIDQ2491035

Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann

Publication date: 18 May 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/16786

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibrium; common agency; marginal contribution; dynamic competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A25: Dynamic games

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