A new secretary problem with rank-based selection and cardinal payoffs
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Publication:2495492
DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2005.11.003zbMath1125.90028WikidataQ57309392 ScholiaQ57309392MaRDI QIDQ2495492
Publication date: 30 June 2006
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2005.11.003
90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives
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