A new secretary problem with rank-based selection and cardinal payoffs

DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2005.11.003zbMath1125.90028OpenAlexW2091087027WikidataQ57309392 ScholiaQ57309392MaRDI QIDQ2495492

J. Neil Bearden

Publication date: 30 June 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2005.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

optimal stoppingsequential searchsecretary problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Related Items (12)

When to stop -- a cardinal secretary search experiment ⋮ No-information secretary problems with cardinal payoffs and Poisson arrivals ⋮ Finding the second-best candidate under the Mallows model ⋮ Optimal rules for the sequential selection of uniform spacings ⋮ Strategic disclosure of random variables ⋮ Sequential selections with minimization of failure ⋮ Hiring Secretaries over Time: The Benefit of Concurrent Employment ⋮ A new look at the returning secretary problem ⋮ Know when to persist: deriving value from a stream buffer ⋮ The best-or-worst and the postdoc problems ⋮ Optimal Stopping for I.I.D. Random Variables Based on the Sequential Information of the Location of Relative Records Only ⋮ Know When to Persist: Deriving Value from a Stream Buffer

Cites Work

• Who solved the secretary problem
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: A new secretary problem with rank-based selection and cardinal payoffs