Maskin's theorem with limited veto power

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.008zbMath1125.91010OpenAlexW2079302393MaRDI QIDQ2506313

Efe A. Ok, Jean-Pierre Benoît

Publication date: 28 September 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

coreimplementationno-veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

On combining implementable social choice rules ⋮ Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations ⋮ Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges ⋮ Epsilon-Nash implementation

Cites Work

• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• Constitutional implementation.
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

This page was built for publication: Maskin's theorem with limited veto power