Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
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Publication:2516235
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.008zbMath1318.91104OpenAlexW2112609724MaRDI QIDQ2516235
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.008
Related Items (19)
Allocation games with caps: from Captain Lotto to all-pay auctions ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Bid caps in large contests ⋮ All-pay auctions with ties ⋮ Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion ⋮ Optimal tie-breaking rules ⋮ Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints ⋮ Resource allocations in the best-of-\(k\) (\(k=2, 3\)) contests ⋮ Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests ⋮ Constrained contests with a continuum of battles ⋮ Equilibrium existence in contests with bid caps ⋮ Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem ⋮ Deadlines in stochastic contests ⋮ A model of a two-stage all-pay auction ⋮ On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions ⋮ Discrimination in contests: a survey ⋮ Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry ⋮ All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints ⋮ Gambling in contests modelled with diffusions
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