Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.12.007MaRDI QIDQ2519487zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò

Publication date 26 January 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143795

zbMATH Keywords

gregarious preferencespublic goodssubgame perfect implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
• Individually rational collective choice
• Stability and Collective Rationality
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations

Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• Exact implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
• On exiting after voting
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences

Cited in

(8)

• Collective choice functions on non-convex problems
• Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities
• Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
• Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4079106 (Why is no real title available?)
• Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
• Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents

This page was built for publication: Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2519487)