\(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
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Publication:2547522
DOI10.1016/0022-247X(63)90006-4zbMath0221.90051OpenAlexW1994914291MaRDI QIDQ2547522
Publication date: 1963
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247x(63)90006-4
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