The logic of conditional obligation. Comments by Harry Beatty
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Publication:2555483
DOI10.1007/BF00255570zbMATH Open0246.02015OpenAlexW2046753842MaRDI QIDQ2555483FDOQ2555483
Authors: Bas C. van Fraassen 
Publication date: 1972
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00255570
Cited In (25)
- A first-order conditional logic for prototypical properties
- A Lewisian taxonomy for deontic logic
- Five faces of minimality
- A logic for deontic dilemmas
- Two approaches to the formalisation of defeasible deontic reasoning
- `Ought' and resolution semantics
- Ceteris paribus conditionals and comparative normalcy
- Deontic logic as founded on nonmonotonic logic
- Reasoning with Moral Conflicts
- A general approach for determining the validity of commonsense assertions using conditional logics
- Preferences in artificial intelligence
- Moral dilemmas, disjunctive obligations, and Kant's principle that ``ought implies ``can
- Varieties of commitment. Approaches to the symbolization of conditional obligations
- The categorical imperative: category theory as a foundation for deontic logic
- An approach to default reasoning based on a first-order conditional logic: Revised report
- A logic of good, should, and would. I
- Conditional logics of normality: A modal approach
- Temporal Alethic Dyadic Deontic Logic and the Contrary-to-Duty Obligation Paradox
- A deontic logic framework allowing for factual detachment
- Be nice! How simple imperatives simplify imperative logic
- Detachment and defeasibility in deontic logic
- Narrow-scoping for wide-scopers
- Conditional obligations in justification logic
- On some weakened forms of transitivity in the logic of conditional obligation
- Contrary-to-duty reasoning: a categorical approach
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