Independent social choice correspondences

DOI10.1007/BF00134113MaRDI QIDQ2563808zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 16 December 1996

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134113

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives conditionfixed agenda social choice correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• Internal Consistency of Choice
• Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs
• Never choose the uniquely largest. A characterization
• Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
• Revealed preference and demand correspondences
• Social choice in economic environments
• Social choice with analytic preferences
• t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off

Cited in

(14)

• An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions
• On two new social choice correspondences.
• Continuous-valued social choice
• Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
• Balancedness of social choice correspondences
• Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
• Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences
• Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
• Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
• Collective choice rules with social maximality
• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences
• Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem

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