Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: an experimental examination
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Publication:2567917
DOI10.1007/s003550100116zbMath1072.91631OpenAlexW2006494907MaRDI QIDQ2567917
Steven R. Beckman, John P. Formby, W. James Smith, Buhong Zheng
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100116
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