Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
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Publication:2568843
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0212-3zbMath1073.91542MaRDI QIDQ2568843
William S. Zwicker, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 19 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/103170
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