Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.006zbMath1115.91033MaRDI QIDQ2573267

Shinji Ohseto

Publication date: 7 November 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

Strategy-proofness; Indivisible objects; Envy-freeness; Pivotal mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

91B14: Social choice

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Cites Work

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