College admissions with affirmative action
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Publication:2576650
DOI10.7916/D8N87NZR 10.1007/s00182-005-0215-7; 10.7916/D8N87NZRzbMath1086.91049MaRDI QIDQ2576650
Publication date: 14 December 2005
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0215-7
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