Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:263367
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.009zbMath1347.91115OpenAlexW2287711032MaRDI QIDQ263367
Publication date: 5 April 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.009
Related Items
Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials, Hybrid decision model and the ranking of experiments, Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty, Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: a reappraisal, Comparing information in general monotone decision problems
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Uncertainty averse preferences
- Informativeness of experiments for MEU
- A simplified axiomatic approach to ambiguity aversion
- The value of a stochastic information structure
- A theory of subjective compound lotteries
- Ambiguity through confidence functions
- Comparing location experiments
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
- Intrinsic preference for information
- Recursive multiple-priors.
- On the nonexistence of Blackwell's theorem-type results with general preference relations
- Informativeness of experiments for MEU -- a recursive definition
- Dynamic variational preferences
- Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Models of Ambiguity Aversion
- Complete Monotone Quasiconcave Duality
- Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences
- Dynamic choice under ambiguity
- Uncertainty Aversion with Second-Order Utilities and Probabilities
- Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
- Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- Learning Under Ambiguity
- Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- Comparative ignorance and the Ellsberg paradox
