Rent dissipation and efficient rationalization in for-hire recreational fishing

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.03.002MaRDI QIDQ2655841zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joshua K. Abbott, James E. Wilen

Publication date 26 January 2010

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

rent dissipationbioeconomic modelingindividual transferable quotasrecreational fisheries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Adjustment Costs in the Theory of Investment of the Firm
• Bioeconomic models of marine recreational fishing
• Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis
• Non-Joint Technologies
• The Optimal Exploitation of Renewable Resource Stocks: Problems of Irreversible Investment
• Valuing water quality changes using a bioeconomic model of a coastal recreational fishery

Cited in

(2)

• Economic benefits of management reform in the northern Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery.
• Markets and rent dissipation in regulated open access fisheries

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