Rent dissipation and efficient rationalization in for-hire recreational fishing

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.03.002zbMATH Open1183.91124OpenAlexW2075648961MaRDI QIDQ2655841FDOQ2655841

Authors: Joshua K. Abbott, James E. Wilen 

Publication date: 26 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.03.002

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zbMATH Keywords

rent dissipationbioeconomic modelingindividual transferable quotasrecreational fisheries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis
• Non-Joint Technologies
• The Optimal Exploitation of Renewable Resource Stocks: Problems of Irreversible Investment
• Adjustment Costs in the Theory of Investment of the Firm
• Valuing water quality changes using a bioeconomic model of a coastal recreational fishery
• Bioeconomic models of marine recreational fishing

Cited In (2)

• Economic benefits of management reform in the northern Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery.
• Markets and rent dissipation in regulated open access fisheries

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