Tight efficiency lower bounds for strategy-proof mechanisms in two-opposite-facility location game

DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2021.106098OpenAlexW3124672424MaRDI QIDQ2656357

Xiao-Dong Hu, Zhongzheng Tang, Xu-jin Chen, Chen-Hao Wang

Publication date: 11 March 2021

Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2021.106098

zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithmsinapproximabilityfacility location game(universally) strategy-proof mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Related Items (7)

Strategyproof facility location with limited locations ⋮ Discrete facility location games with different preferences ⋮ Facility location games with ordinal preferences ⋮ Two homogeneous facility location games with a minimum distance requirement on a circle ⋮ Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with max-variant cost ⋮ Mechanism design for facility location with fractional preferences and minimum distance ⋮ Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost

Cites Work

• Heterogeneous facility location without money
• Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
• Mechanism design for two-opposite-facility location games with penalties on distance

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