Specialist vs. generalist: efficiency in multitasking

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109699MaRDI QIDQ2659934zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Clemens Buchen, Jenny Kragl, Alberto Palermo

Publication date 29 March 2021

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109699

zbMATH Keywords

generalistincentivesspecializationskillsmultitask model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• The Essence of Multitasking
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• HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND THE TRANSITION FROM SPECIALIZATION TO MULTITASKING

Cites work

• Strategic shirking: a theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization
• Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design

Cited in

(5)

• Optimal task assignments
• Arithmetics of research specialization
• Incomplete division of labor: error-prone multitaskers coexist with specialists
• Strategic shirking: a theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization
• Can specialization be optimal when tasks are complementary?

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