Foundationalism with infinite regresses of probabilistic support

DOI10.1007/S11229-016-1289-4MaRDI QIDQ2666895zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William Roche

Publication date 23 November 2021

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1289-4

zbMATH Keywords

Atkinsonfoundationalisminfinite regresses of probabilistic supportjustificationPeijnenburg

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Recommendations

• Probabilistic justification and the regress problem
• The consistency of probabilistic regresses. A reply to Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson
• The consistency of probabilistic regresses: some implications for epistemological infinitism
• The solvability of probabilistic regresses. A reply to Frederik Herzberg
• Probabilistic epistemic chains

Cites work

• Evidential support, transitivity, and screening-off
• Fractal patterns in reasoning
• Further results on the intransitivity of evidential support
• Grounds and limits: Reichenbach and foundationalist epistemology
• Justification by an infinity of conditional probabilities
• Justification by infinite loops
• On doxastic justification and properly basing one's beliefs
• Probabilistic justification and the regress problem
• The consistency of probabilistic regresses. A reply to Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson
• The consistency of probabilistic regresses: some implications for epistemological infinitism
• The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence
• The solvability of probabilistic regresses. A reply to Frederik Herzberg
• The trouble with infinitism
• Transitivity and intransitivity in evidential support: some further results

Cited in

(5)

• Probabilistic justification and the regress problem
• The reductio argument against epistemic infinitism
• Foundationalism, probability, and mutual support
• Grounds and limits: Reichenbach and foundationalist epistemology
• The consistency of probabilistic regresses. A reply to Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson

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