Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
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Cites work
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- A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
- A re-characterization of the Kemeny distance
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
- Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction
- Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
- Ordinal Measures of Association
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- Properties of ladder tournaments
- Social choice and individual values
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Ternary voting games
- The influence relation for ternary voting games
- Valuing inputs under supply uncertainty: the Bayesian Shapley value
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
Cited in
(6)- Individual preferences and democratic processes: two theorems with implications for electoral politics
- Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
- The reciprocity set
- Abstention, multiple issues, and the Banzhaf power index
- Comparing social preferences: incompleteness and intransitivity
- Rationing to avoid conflict: a centralized assignment problem
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