Recursive games: uniform value, Tauberian theorem and the Mertens conjecture ``\(\mathrm{Maxmin}=\lim v_n=\lim v_\lambda\)
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Publication:267087
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0496-4zbMath1388.91043arXiv1506.00949WikidataQ122871032 ScholiaQ122871032MaRDI QIDQ267087
Publication date: 8 April 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.00949
91A05: 2-person games
90C39: Dynamic programming
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Related Items
Upper and lower values in zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information, Tauberian theorem for value functions, Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators: applications to zero-sum stochastic games, Uniform value for recursive games with compact action sets, A Tauberian Theorem for Nonexpansive Operators and Applications to Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
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