Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.001zbMath1498.91346OpenAlexW4229459388MaRDI QIDQ2675442

Federico Trombetta, Guido Merzoni

Publication date: 23 September 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

panderingpopulismpolitical agencyasymmetric mismatchspecial interest groups

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• A Political Theory of Populism *
• Informative Cheap Talk in Elections

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