Strategic admission behavior and its implications: evidence from a cardiac surgery department

DOI10.1007/S40305-021-00377-2MaRDI QIDQ2687677zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 7 March 2023

Published in Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-021-00377-2

zbMATH Keywords

admission policybeds sharingdecentralized control systemdynamic programmingempirical studystrategic behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Research data for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-11) Discrete-time games (91A50)

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Cites work

• Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game-theoretic model
• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3

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