Strategic admission behavior and its implications: evidence from a cardiac surgery department

DOI10.1007/S40305-021-00377-2OpenAlexW4210822225MaRDI QIDQ2687677

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 7 March 2023

Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-021-00377-2

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic programmingempirical studystrategic behaviordecentralized control systemadmission policybeds sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Research data for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-11)

Cites Work

• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3
• Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game-theoretic model

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