Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0042MaRDI QIDQ2690343zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guillem Roig

Publication date 16 March 2023

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0042

zbMATH Keywords

consumer preference costsswitching coststacit collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
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Cites work

• A comment on: Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Mixed pricing in oligopoly
• Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

Cited in

(3)

• Colluding with a conscience
• Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity
• Collusion and customization

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