The epistemological objection to modal primitivism

DOI10.1007/S11229-018-01954-4OpenAlexW2892766643MaRDI QIDQ2695043

Jennifer L. Wang

Publication date: 30 March 2023

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01954-4

zbMATH Keywords

epistemologyreliabilismmodal realismmodal primitivism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (1)

Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies

Cites Work

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• Possible worlds for modal primitivists
• Necessity and truth theories
• Logical Constants: A Modalist Approach¹
• On Set Theoretic Possible Worlds
• Principles for Possibilia
• Another Look at Armstrong's Combinatorialism
• Possible Worlds

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